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In this paper, the concept of Income Satisfaction Inequality is operationalized on the 
basis of individual responses to an Income Satisfaction question posed in the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Income satisfaction is the subjective analogue of the 
objective income concept and includes objective income inequality as a special case. 
The  paper  introduces  a  method  to  decompose  Income  Satisfaction  Inequality 
according  to  the  contributions  from  variables  such  as  income,  education,  and  the 
number of children. Given the panel structure of the data, inequality may be attributed 
partly to permanent individual circumstances and partly to transitory changes. The 
paper shows that by far the largest part of the satisfaction inequality has to be ascribed 
to unobserved heterogeneity. Distinguishing between a structural and an unexplained 
part of inequality we find that income explains the largest part of structural Income 
Satisfaction  Inequality  together  with  household  membership;  for  non-working 
individuals, the age distribution is very relevant as well.  
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Since Gini (1912) and Dalton (1920), the distribution and inequality of income has 
been an important subject of study for economic and social scientists. Recent surveys 
are offered in the handbooks edited by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1999) and Silber 
(1999). The study of income inequality entails two main issues (see Cowell (1999)). 
First, the income concept has to be operationalized and measured. Second, a definition 
of inequality has to be agreed upon and consequently an index of inequality, namely a 
measure of the dispersion of income or welfare, has to be chosen.  
The basic question underneath is why we are so interested in income inequality. 
It  is  not  just  an  administrative  statistic.  The  reason  is  that  income  or  ‘equivalent 
income’ is taken as a proxy for welfare. It follows that income inequality is seen as 
synonymous  to  welfare  inequality,  a  performance  index  of  society.  The  literature 
bears witness that there is no generally accepted measure of welfare. This is caused 
among  other  reasons  by  uneasiness  about  whether  income  in  itself  is  a  suitable 
measure  of  welfare.  This  is  especially  true  for  modern  welfare  states  where  a 
considerable part of our consumption is provided by the state and not through the 
market.  Additionally,  income  has  to  be  corrected  for  individual  and  household 
characteristics if it aims at measuring welfare. For example, it is evident that two 
households with the same income but different family sizes fs will need different 
incomes to be equally satisfied. Hence, income y should be ‘corrected’ for family size, 
which would lead to what is known as ‘equivalent income’  y  . For instance, if we 
apply the correction factor g(fs) equivalent income becomes  . ( ) y y g fs =  . In order to 
compare incomes and to get some idea about income inequality, it does not make 
much sense to  define  income  inequality on nominal  income.  Inequality should be 
measured  with  respect  to  equivalent  incomes.  It  is  evident  that  this  will  change 
income inequality. For instance, if we use the variance of log-incomes as inequality 
measure, we have  
 
var(ln( )) var(ln( )) var(ln( ( )) 2cov(ln( ),ln( ( ))) y y g fs y g fs = + +      (1) 
 
This shows that the inequality of equivalent incomes, as defined by the log-variance, 






the other. It is evident that there are more intervening variables than family size. Say, 
we have a vector x of such variables. Then the definition of equivalent income may be 
straightforwardly  generalized  to  correct  for  x.  The  problem  is  the  definition  and 
empirical  operationalization  of  the  correction  factor  g(x).  Our  definition  will  be 
simple. If two individuals A and B report to be equally satisfied with their incomes yA 
and yB , we assume those two incomes to be equivalent. This implies that if we take A 
as the reference then  ( ) B A g x y y = . In practice, this factor is derived by looking at 
’income satisfaction questions’, which are now posed as a matter of routine in socio-
economic  surveys.  It  may  also  be  that  x  includes  some  unobservable  individual 
characteristics  e . Then exact correction at the individual level will be impossible. 
However, we can still operationalize for those variables that are observable. 
In this paper, we try a new approach to assess inequality by not looking at 
nominal income as our basic variable but at the satisfaction derived from income. We 
call this income satisfaction and we measure it by means of individual answers to an 
income  satisfaction  question.    We  believe  that  this  empirical  approach  leads  to  a 
welfare  inequality  concept,  which  does  more  right  to  our  intuitive  feelings  about 
inequality than the measures that account for income differences only. 
It  is  possible  to  define  and  measure  an  index  for  income  satisfaction.  The 
income  satisfaction  concept  used  in  this  paper  does  implicitly  incorporate  the 
necessary corrections. Income satisfaction is empirically defined through the analysis 
of  individual  responses  to  an  income  satisfaction  question.  The  paper  aims  at 
explaining  the  individual’s  income  satisfaction  by  objective  variables  x,  such  as 
income,  education,  and  number  of  individuals  in  the  household.  We  denote  that 
satisfaction by  ( ; , ) f y x q , where y stands for nominal income, x for other individual 
circumstances,  and  q  for  a  vector  of  parameters  to  be  estimated.  If  there 
holds ( ; , ) f y x y q º ,  the  subjective  perception  will  coincide  with  nominal  income. 
Hence,  usual  income inequality is  embedded in  the income satisfaction inequality 
concept as a special case.  
The income satisfaction inequality (Isat) is here measured in such a way that if 
satisfaction would coincide with income, that is  y x y f º ) , ; ( q , then (Isat) would equal 
the  variance  of  log-incomes.  The  variance  of  the  logarithm  is  one  of  the  most 






variance, the coefficient of variation, the Atkinson index, the Gini coefficient, and 
Theil’s  entropy  measure  (see  Atkinson,  1970;  Sen,  1973).  All  those  inequality 
measures are functions of moments of the income distribution. It is well known that 
the distribution of personal and household incomes is rather well –approximated by a 
log- normal distribution. When the income distribution is (approximately) log-normal 
) , (
2 s m L , all income  inequality  indexes are (approximately) functions  of the two 
distribution parameters. The parameterm  gives the position of the distribution, while 
2 s   is  a  measure  for  the  relative  income  differences.  The  log-variance  (
2 s )  as  a 
measure of inequality has the advantage that it does not depend on the money unit. 
Other  measures  are  simple  functions  of 
2 s andm .  Theil  (1967,  chapter  4;  1979) 
shows that the Theil Entropy measure equals (½)
2 s  in the case of log-normality. Van 
Praag  (1978)  derived  a  similar  result  for  the  Atkinson  index,  and  Aitchison  and 
Brown (1960) for the Gini index. If approximate log-normality holds, there is not 
much to be gained by considering more indices simultaneously, given the one-to-one 
relationship between such indexes. Thus we will exclusively focus on the variance of 
the logarithm. This choice is clearly a subjective one but this index is very useful 
when looking at the causes  of inequality.  It  is obvious that  we may  apply to  the 
income satisfaction  ) , ; ( q x y f any inequality index that may be applied to nominal 
income y. This holds for the Atkinson index and the related social welfare function 
(SWF-) approaches. Let the SWF be defined as  ( ( , ; )) n n
n
h f y x q å , where h(.) stands 
for the contribution to the SWF of an individual with individual satisfaction f. Then 
the SWF-maximizing situation is found by maximizing the SWF under the constraint 
n
n
y Y = å , where Y stands for (fixed) national income. Under general circumstances 
this optimum will be reached if individual satisfactions (not incomes !) are equal. 
The paper focuses on the study of the causes of income satisfaction inequality 
(Isat). This is equivalent to examining which objective variables contribute most to the 
existing  income  satisfaction  variance.  Since  individual  income  satisfaction  can  be 
partly explained by differences in income, the number of children, age, and education, 
income satisfaction inequality can be decomposed along the same lines. Thus, Isat is, 






variables. If we have longitudinal data, income satisfaction inequality can be further 
decomposed according to individual permanent differences in objective factors and 
individual  transitory  changes.  Finally,  income  satisfaction  inequality  can  also  be 
decomposed into within-and between-group inequalities. We consider the inequality 
between  East  and  West  Germany  and  between  the  groups  of  workers  and  non-
workers. 
The  novel  contribution  to  the  literature  of  the  present  approach  to  measure 
income satisfaction inequality is threefold. First, if individual satisfaction with own 
income  is  not  only  caused  by  income,  but  is  also  dependent  on  other  individual 
characteristics, such as age and family size, the income satisfaction concept implicitly 
includes  the  corrections  required  to  make  individual  welfare  equivalent  and 
comparable. Second, the empirical estimation of income satisfaction allows for testing 
different specifications of the relationship between income and income satisfaction. 
As income inequality has not to be seen as an administrative index but as an index of 
the inequality in income satisfactions, we need the best possible specification of that 
relation between income and income satisfaction. Third, as we know the causes of 
income  satisfaction,  we  may  also  view  satisfaction  inequality  as  caused  by 
inequalities with respect to the underlying variables like income, age, household size, 
and so on. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and the income 
satisfaction  question.  Section  3  presents  the  estimation  results  for  the  income 
satisfaction question. Section 4 discusses the income satisfaction inequality concept, 
the  decomposition  method,  and  presents  the  empirical  findings  on  the  causes  of 
inequality. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Income satisfaction 
The empirical analysis is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) data. 
The GSOEP is a longitudinal household panel that started in the Federal Republic of 
Germany  in  1984.  After  the  reunification  of  Germany,  (former)  East-German 
households have been included (see Wagner et. al, 1993). This paper is based on the 
waves 1992 to 1997, including more than 20,000 individuals of which about 30% are 
Eastern individuals. It is well-known that the two parts of the country have lived since 






regulations, the supply of public goods and housing, and last but not least political 
philosophy. Although the populations are converging since the reunification of the 
two German states, we think it still prudent to handle them as different sub-samples 
for  the  period  1992-7.  Further,  the  sample  is  divided  between  workers  and  non-
workers, as we assume that the significance of income will differ between workers 
and non-workers. For workers the income concept will have two significances. The 
first one is that of income as a source of material well-being. The second meaning is 
derived from the fact that the income level is strongly correlated with how your work 
contribution is evaluated by the employer and the social environment. For individuals, 
who live from pensions, social benefits or alimonies the second meaning of income is 
not or hardly relevant. Each group will also refer itself to a different reference group. 
It is known that many people without a proper job environment feel rather isolated 
from  what  is  going  on  in  society  at  large.  The  set  of  non-  workers  is  somewhat 
heterogeneous,  since  it  includes  unemployed  workers,  housewives,  who  have  no 
intention to participate in the labor force and retired individuals. More precisely, the 
Western group consists of 65% women, 23% men younger than 65 and 12% males 
older than 65. For the Eastern non-working population the corresponding figures are 
62%, 28% and 10%. 
From table 2 we will see whether these distinctions are empirically justified. 
Since  the  numbers  of  individuals  who  switch  from  East  to  West,  or  from  ‘non-
working’  to  ‘working’,  and  vice  versa  are  very  small,  they  are  treated  as  new 
respondents in the new group (see Hunt, 1999, 2000; Pannenberg, 1997). 
The  Income  Satisfaction  (IS)-  question  is  asked  to  all  respondents  of  the 
GSOEP. Satisfaction questions have appeared in questionnaires for over more than 
three decades starting with Cantril (1965) and Likert (1932). The Income Satisfaction 
question in the GSOEP that is used in this paper runs as follows 
 
’How satisfied are you today with the following areas of your life? 
(Please answer by using the following scale, in which 0 means totally unhappy and 10 means 
totally happy) 







The answer to this question is termed the individual’s Income Satisfaction (IS) level. 
In this module the discrete answers vary from 0 to 10, where 0 stands for ‘totally 
unhappy’ and 10 for ‘totally happy’. Satisfaction questions have been amply used by 
economists,  psychologists,  and  sociologists.  Economists  have  used  answers  to 
satisfaction questions as a proxy measure of the individual’s welfare in order to study 
individual preferences, behavior, welfare, and poverty (see, for example, Clark and 
Oswald (1994), Frey and Stutzer (2002), Plug, Van Praag, Krause and Wagner (1997), 
DiTella et al., 2001; Easterlin, 2000; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Van Praag, 2001; Frijters, 
2000; Frey and Stutzer, 2000; Ng, 1997; Van Praag, 1971; Van Praag et al., 2001). 
In order for IS questions to be meaningful, one needs to assume that respondents 
are able to understand and to answer subjective questions and that they evaluate and 
respond to such questions in a similar manner, such that individual answers can be 
compared.  This  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  individuals  who  grade  their 
satisfaction  at  8 are twice as  satisfied  as those who  grade their  satisfaction by 4. 
Interpersonal  comparability  does  not  imply  a  cardinal  interpretation  per  se.  The 
literature on subjective well-being, which is large and growing (for an overview see 
Kahneman  et  al.  1999  and  Diener  et  al.,  1999)  shows  clear  consistencies  across 
studies.  This  may  be  interpreted  as  empirical  evidence  of  the  meaningfulness  of 
questions on satisfaction and of the capacity and willingness of individuals to respond 
to  such  questions.  The  assumption  of  interpersonal  comparability  has  been  long 
discussed in the literature (see, for example, Sen, 1999 and Van Praag, 1991). In this 
paper, we start from the working hypothesis that individual answers to satisfaction 
questions are (ordinally) comparable among individuals. Thus, it is assumed that two 
individuals,  answering  a  ‘5’,  experience  the  same  level  of  income  satisfaction, 
although their material circumstances may differ. Notwithstanding the fact that there 
is a vast amount of literature, which either implicitly or explicitly starts from this 
comparability  assumption,  it  is  impossible  to  provide  direct  evidence  that  this 
assumption is warranted. That would require the existence of a basic and generally 
accepted method of direct (e.g. physical) satisfaction measurement, but such a method 
does not exist (yet). If we ask other questions we find indeed that one question is 
correlated with or predicts the results of another instrument quite well. Obviously, but 
this  is a  technical aspect,  in  practice  comparability  is  always  approximate,  as  the 






Objective  variables  are  not  the  only  determinants  of  individual  satisfaction. 
Personal  traits,  such  as  extroversion,  optimism,  or  capacity  to  adapt  to  adverse 
situations, are also important determinants of individual’s welfare. In fact, it is argued 
that only about 8 to 20% of individual life satisfaction, which is an even broader 
concept than income satisfaction, is explained by objectively measurable variables 
(Argyle, 1999; Diener et al., 1999; Kahneman et al., 1999). It is also important to bear 
in mind that the individual is subject to adaptation phenomena and the relative income 
hypothesis. Adaptation theory suggests that individuals adapt their satisfaction norms 
to new situations (Helson, 1964). This phenomenon is called ‘the hedonic treadmill’ 
by Brickman and Campbell (1971), while Van Praag (1971) coined it ‘preference 
drift’.  The  relative  income  hypothesis  says  that  the  individual’s  satisfaction  with 
income depends on how its income compares to that of others (Kapteyn and Van 
Herwaarden,  1980,  Clark  and  Oswald  (1996),  Ferrer-i-Carbonell,  2002)).  Thus, 
changes in one’s income or in the income distribution of a society will not necessarily 
be reflected into changes in income satisfaction . This has an ethical dimension that is 
not further discussed in this paper.  
Table 1 presents the distribution frequencies of IS in the total sample. We see 
that the bulk of the population is found in the classes 4 to 8, but there are also a 
substantial number of observations in the extremes. It is especially remarkable that 
only about 0.5 % of the respondents evaluate their own financial situation by zero. We 
see  that the average  difference in satisfaction between Western workers and non-
workers is not large, but that the difference between the Western and Eastern part of 
the country is much larger. The same pattern is found when we look at Table 1b., in 
which  we  tabulated  the  satisfactions,  differentiated  according  to  income  quartiles. 
Table 1b shows that IS is on average larger, the richer an individual is. This holds 
within the sub-samples. For example, the richer 6% of West workers have, in average, 







Table 1.a Frequency distributions and averages of Income Satisfaction (IS),  
GSOEP 1992-1997 
IS  West 
Workers 




0  0.56%  0.59%  0.78%  1.33% 
1  0.49%  0.52%  0.81%  1.24% 
2  1.16%  2.16%  1.94%  3.12% 
3  2.48%  4.21%  3.65%  6.28% 
4  4.05%  6.15%  4.48%  7.74% 
5  10.90%  18.02%  12.29%  19.29% 
6  11.42%  16.62%  10.39%  13.86% 
7  20.75%  23.25%  17.80%  17.07% 
8  27.41%  20.28%  24.67%  19.44% 
9  12.67%  5.70%  12.04%  6.22% 
10  8.11%  2.51%  11.14%  4.41% 
         
Average  7.092  6.332  6.992  6.120 
Total 
observations 
30539  11360  20611  8501 
 
 
Table 1.b Averages of Income Satisfaction (IS) per income percentile
1,  
GSOEP 1992-1997 
  Lowest 25%  Lowest 50%  Lowest 75%  Top 6 % 
West Workers         
Average Income  3011  4105  5432  12088 
Average IS  6.633  6.989  7.224  7.976 
East Workers         
Average Income  2697  3463  4188  8955 
Average IS  5.769  6.202  6.366  7.693 
West Non-Workers         
Average Income  2276  3294  4675  10938 
Average IS  6.384  6.876  7.214    7.898 
East Non-Workers         
Average Income  1808  2566  3463  7332 
Average IS  5.598  6.006  6.387  7.448 
 
3. Estimation  
Satisfaction  questions  are  usually  explained  by  means  of  latent  variable  models 
because IS is an ordered categorical variable. In our case it takes the values 0, 1,…, 
10.  We  assume  the  usual  Ordered  Probit  model.  The  real  axis  is  partitioned  in 
intervals ( ] ( ) ¥ ¥ - , ,..., , 10 0 m m , such that the latent variable  ( ]
*
1 , i i IS m m + Î  if IS = i.  
We assume that the latent variable IS* obeys the equation 
                                                            






* ( ) nt t y nt z nt x nt y n x n nt n Ln IS C y Z X y X a a a b b e n = + + + + + + +            (2) 
 
where n stands for the individual and t for time. The explanatory variables are divided 
into two groups, i.e. X and Z. The first are included in the regression in two forms: at 
the yearly value, Xnt, and as the average of Xn across time t ( n X ). The vector Xnt includes 
number of children and adults in the household. The vector of explanatory variables Z are 
only included at their yearly value (Znt). As Equation (2) shows, income is included both at its 
yearly value and as an average across the 6 years period. 
Income satisfaction is assumed to depend on individual and household objective 
characteristics. Next, the specification is discussed (see also van Praag et al., 2003). 
We assume that satisfaction depends on log-household income y, and the number of 
individuals to be supported, where we distinguish between children (below 16) and 
adults. As we assume that  the number  of children will  have a  negative effect on 
income satisfaction, but that this effect will be less negative, the higher the household 
income, we introduce an interaction term between income and children as well. Age is 
included as log and log-square, because it is frequently found that satisfaction, not 
only with income but also with the job, has a U-shape effect on satisfaction. It implies 
that as we grow older our needs increase. We become less satisfied with income if it 
stays the same over time. This has to do with adaptation and with the fact that most 
members of our reference group will enjoy income growth over time. Due to the 
squared  term  the  effect  reaches  a  minimum  about  fifty;  after  that  age  the  effect 
reduces.  A similar effect with respect to job satisfaction  was found by  Clark and 
Oswald. We assume that living together will have a positive scale effect, as household 
chores can be divided over two and there are substantial economies of scale when 
living  together.  On  the  other  hand  a  family  with  two  breadwinners  has  less  time 
available  for  household  production  than  a  traditional  household,  which  is  still 
frequently found in Germany 1997. Hence, we assume that a two-breadwinner family 
will be less satisfied than a one-breadwinner family with the same household income. 
Finally,  we  include  time  dummies,  representing  inflation  and  general  ’rising 
expectations’ and a gender dummy, which equals one for a male respondent and zero 






As  discussed  above,  some  of  the  explanatory  variables  are  included  in  two 
ways, viz. as their mean value and at their annual values. We do this because we 
expect that changes in the X-variables will not immediately affect income satisfaction 
to the full extent, but that there will be an adaptation process to new circumstances. 
The  coefficient  of  the  long-term  average  n X stands  for  the  effect  of  a  permanent 
change, while the coefficient of Xnt - n X stands for the immediate short-term effect of a 
change. For statistical reasons this specification was advocated by Mundlak (1978). 
He  interpreted  the n X   as  picking  up  the  correlation  between  observed  individual 
characteristics and the individual unobserved effects. In this way, Mundlak aimed at 
ensuring orthogonality between X and n . 
Equation (1) can be rewritten as 
 
* ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) nt t y nt n x nt n y y n x x n z nt nt n Ln IS C y y X X y X Z a a a b a b a e n = + - + - + + + + + + +
                        (3) 
 
In equation (2) we distinguish for the X-variables a transitory and a permanent effect. 
The permanent effect is (a + b), and the transitory effect is a. For some variables, the 
permanent effects have a clear interpretation. For example, the effect of mean income 
is the permanent income effect (Friedman, 1957).  
As we assume a considerable correlation between annual errors, we model the 
error as  nt n e n + . The individual random effect  n n  and the error term  nt e  are assumed 
to be normally distributed and to be correlated neither with each other nor with the 
explanatory variables X and Z. The total residual variance equals 
2 2 ( ) ( ) s n s e + . The 
individual random effect, which varies over individuals n but which is time-constant 
per individual, may be interpreted as standing for those individual psychological traits 
that are not observed in the data set (unobserved heterogeneity). We notice that in the 
literature of the evolution of wages over time some more complex error structures are 
implemented (see Lillard and Willis (1978), Baker (1997), Dickens (2000)). These 
interesting  ideas  seem  to  be  outside  the  scope  of  this  introductory  paper,  which 






It  is  well  known  that  identification  in  the  Probit  model  is  only  possible  by 
addition of a normalizing condition, for which we traditionally take s
2(e)=1. If we 
would impose s
2(e)=2, we would have to multiply all effects by  2 . It is easy to see 
that  the  t-  values  under  both  specifications  will  be  the  same.  However,  we  may 
impose other identifying conditions like setting one of the non-zero effects equal to 
one.  Say,  under  the  standard-normalization  the  effect  was  a,  then  under  the  new 
normalization  all  coefficients  would  have  been  multiplied  by  a
-1  while  the  error 
variance  would  be  multiplied  by  a
-2.  Hence,  one  can  use  standard-software  and 
change the identifying condition after estimation. This indeterminacy implies that the 
value  of  the  income  satisfaction  inequality  index,  which  we  are  about  to  define, 
depends on the specific normalization chosen. In order to make the satisfaction index 
simultaneously comparable between different samples and with the variance of log-
incomes, we re-normalize by multiplying the Probit-estimates with the factor  
1/(ay+ by). For the variances used in the following tables this implies a multiplication 
by (ay+ by)
-2. By applying this normalization we ensure that the structural parts of 
income satisfaction estimated with different error variances, may be compared with 
each other. 
Table  2  presents  the  estimation  results  for  equation  (1)  as  estimated  by  an 
Ordered Probit model with individual random effects. Table 2 shows that we allowed 
for the inclusion of a permanent effect and a transitory effect for three variables, i.e. 
income, number of children in the household, and number of adults. The income
2 
effects are all positive and significant. Hence, normalization by division through the 
sum  of  both  effects  is  a  valid  operation.  The  transitory  income  effect  for  West-
German workers equals 0.261. For Western non-workers, the effect is of the same 
order. For Eastern workers and non-workers the transitory income coefficients are 
much  larger.  The  income  effect  also  depends  on  the  number  of  children  via  the 
interaction term income-children. This interaction term has a slight mitigating effect 
on the cost of children for Westerners, but it is non-significant for Easterners.  
                                                            
2 Income is the answer to the following question: “If everything is taken together: How high is the total 
monthly income of all the household members at present? Please give the net monthly amount, in other 
words after the deduction of tax and national insurance contributions. Regular payments such as rent 
subsidy,  child  benefit,  government  grants,  subsistence  allowances,  etc.,  should  be  included.  If  not 






The  age  coefficients  are  all  significant,  where  Ln(IS
*)  has  a  U-shape  with 
respect to age. Western workers reach a minimum income satisfaction at the age of 44 
and Eastern workers at 56. For non-workers, income satisfaction attains its minimum 
at around 37. Apart from psychological developments over human life there may be 
more mundane reasons: households needs increase with the number of children and 
spending on consumer durables and housing is more important in the first half of the 
life cycle. Later in life children are leaving the household and investments in housing 
and furniture have been completed. Another reason for this fall in satisfaction during 
the first period in life may be that individuals get used their material status and take it 
as a matter of course. The education effect is positive in the West, non-significant for 
Eastern workers, and negative for Eastern non-workers.  The effect of more education 
is ambiguous. On one hand more education leads to more efficient consumption. This 
would point to a positive effect on income satisfaction. We find this effect for West-
German citizens. On the other hand more education widens your horizon and will 
increase someone’s expectations. This would yield a negative effect. The education 
effect is a mixed product. For East-Germany we find that both factors cancel out for 
workers, while the widening horizon-effect has the upper hand for East-German non-
workers. The presence of more adults or children has a negative effect on income 
satisfaction  for  all  four  sub-samples.  If  one  lives  together  with  a  partner  in  one 
household, this increases individual income satisfaction. Male respondents are less 
content  than  females.  The  estimation  results  show  that  this  coefficient  is  non-
significant. The individual random effect, i.e. individual unmeasured psychological 
characteristics, explains between 30 and 40% of the total unexplained variance, being 
somewhat higher for Westerners than for Easterners. 
We notice that the equation differences between sub-samples show that it is 






Table 2. Income Satisfaction (IS) Regression. 
Ordered Probit with individual random effects, GSOEP 1992-1997 
  West Workers  East Workers  West Non-Workers  East Non-Workers 
  Estim.  Est/StErr  Estim.  Est/StErr  Estim.  Est/StErr  Estim.  Est/StErr 
Constant  5.427  3.461  3.660  1.954  16.445  13.431  19.997  10.647 
Dummy for 1992  0.416  12.422  -0.079  -2.054  0.141  3.664  -0.359  -5.521 
Dummy for 1993  0.425  12.168  0.174  4.303  0.384  9.791  -0.064  -1.076 
Dummy for 1994  0.346  11.362  -0.288  -7.822  0.491  14.820  0.098  1.892 
Dummy for 1995  0.300  8.582  0.115  2.861  0.387  10.060  0.141  2.199 
Dummy for 1996  0.412  11.157  0.226  5.456  0.351  8.805  0.170  2.627 
                 
Ln(age)  -5.354  -5.981  -4.223  -3.915  -11.861  -17.887  -12.863  -12.779 
Ln(age) ^ 2  0.707  5.614  0.529  3.442  1.641  18.114  1.767  12.847 
Minimum age reached at  43.993    54.310    37.101    38.053   
Ln(net family income)  0.261  7.139  0.422  8.710  0.240  6.023  0.427  5.786 
Ln(years of education)  0.258  3.334  0.009  0.090  0.260  2.943  -0.325  -2.588 
Ln(number of adults)  -0.176  -4.735  -0.247  -4.651  -0.041  -0.848  -0.152  -1.600 
Ln(number of children+1)  -0.727  -1.973  -0.408  -0.839  -0.778  -2.197  -0.817  -1.140 
Ln(net family income)                                                                 
                  *Ln(child.+1) 
0.077  1.732  0.024  0.394  0.079  1.819  0.082  0.919 
Male  -0.040  -1.319  -0.073  -2.212  -0.257  -7.392  -0.134  -2.794 
Living together  0.211  5.860  0.216  3.969  0.259  8.393  0.100  1.743 
Two Earners   -0.032  -0.964  -0.083  -1.835  XXX    XXX   
                 
Mean (Ln(net family inc.)  0.739  13.716  0.578  8.666  0.760  13.659  0.573  6.116 
Mean (Ln(children+1))  -0.263  -4.572  -0.330  -4.206  -0.452  -6.662  -0.575  -4.673 
Mean (Ln(adults))  -0.206  -3.855  0.003  0.052  -0.268  -3.991  -0.148  -1.341 
                 
                 
( ) s e   1.338    0.966    1.217    1.250   
) (n s   1.056    0.711    1.018    0.830   
% of variance due to v  38.37%    35.12%    41.16%    30.61%   
Number of Observations  30356    11256    20510    8501   
Log Likelihood  -56603    -21157    -39217.9    -16957   
Number of Individuals  8130    3191    6361    2690   
 
4. Income satisfaction inequality 
This  section  presents  the concept of  income satisfaction  inequality (Isat), which  is 
derived by generalizing the objective income inequality concept. Let us assume two 
individuals A and B with incomes yA and yB and personal circumstances XA and XB, 
respectively, where X stands for the vector of all relevant variables except income.  
Then the incomes yA and yB are equivalent satisfaction-wise, if  
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Or in words, incomes yA and yB are equivalent if individuals A and B are equally 
satisfied  financially,  given  their  different  background  circumstances  X.  The  case 
*( , ) ( ) IS y X ln y º ,  where  income  satisfaction  and  objective  income  coincide,  is  a 
special  case  of  the  income  satisfaction  concept.  This  would  be  the  case  if  all 
coefficients in Equation (2) would have been zero except the income coefficients. 
From  Table  2,  it  is  clear  that  other  variables  than  income  influence  income 
satisfaction, i.e., populations with the same objective income distributions may have a 
different distribution of income satisfaction. 
In contrast to what is sometimes thought most income inequality measures are 
based  on  a  cardinal  utility  concept.  The  inequality  index  is  defined  as 
1 1 ( ( ),..., ( )) N N I I f y f y = .  It  follows  that  the  impacts  of  income  increases  for  one 
individual are cardinally defined and the same holds for the comparison of income 
changes between individuals. We may change the functions  1 1 ( ),..., ( ) N N f y f y  into 
monotonic transforms 1 1 ( ),..., ( ) N N f y f y   but then the inequality index will be changed 
as well. We may think, for instance, on  ( ) f y y = and  ( ) ln( ) f y y =  . We may see 
* f IS =   as the specification in this paper.  
In this paper, we consider 
* ( ( )) sat Var Ln IS I =  as our inequality measure.
3 It is 
well known that the variance of log-incomes is not an ideal inequality measure, and 
this holds as well for the variance of income satisfactions, but the problem is that 
other measures also suffer from problems. There is no ideal measure. One evident 
advantage of the variance is its decomposability, which we shall use in this paper. As 
pointed out before, we may just as well take another statistic based on 
* ( ) Ln IS  like 
Theil’s entropy, or the Atkinson index. Within the scope of this paper this would not 
add new information.  
Table 3 presents estimates of the income satisfaction inequalities in the four 
sub-samples, which we compare with the corresponding objective income inequality. 
In the first line we present the objective income inequalities. In the second line we 
present the corresponding income satisfaction inequalities, defined as the variances of 
the structural parts of the estimated income satisfactions. In the third line we present 
                                                            
3 The variance of Ln(IS) was calculated using individual weights as available in the GSOEP data. The 






the structural variance as a percentage of the ’total’ variance, that is, the structural 
variance plus the error variance (
2 2 ( ) ( ) s n s e + ). For workers total variance is twenty 
times (!) the structural variance while for non-workers the proportion is ten to one. 
This is of course due to the small explanatory power of these models in terms of R
2 or 
pseudo-R
2. We may also interpret this result as saying that by far the largest part of 
satisfaction inequality is caused by unobserved heterogeneity and/or random errors. 
As far as it is caused by random disturbances we cannot improve on this result. As far 
as  it  is  caused  by  unobserved  variables  we  have  to  look  after  additional  relevant 
observable  individual  characteristics.  Both  objective  income  and  structural 
satisfaction inequalities seem to underestimate the perceived inequality.  We have to 
accept this as a fact of life. It does not imply that the structural inequalities have 
become devoid of interest. 
 
Table 3: Objective and income satisfaction inequalities 












         
Variance of Log-income satisfactions 
(structural part) 
0.186  0.141  0.357  0.328 
 structural part as percentage of  total  
variance  
6.03%  8.94%  12.41%  12.70% 
Total satisfaction variance          3.08          1.57           2.87  2.58 
Number of Observations  30356  11256  20510  8501 
 
Table 3 shows that objective income inequality is larger in the West than in the East, 
both for workers and for non-workers. We also see that income inequality is larger 
within  the  group  of  non-workers  than  for  workers.  For  workers  the  structural 
satisfaction inequality is smaller than that with respect to objective incomes, while the 
opposite holds for non-workers. For instance, for western non-workers the objective 
inequality is 0.284 and the subjective analogue is 0.357. 
Next, we present an income satisfaction inequality decomposition to identify the 
contribution of each observable variable X and Z to income satisfaction inequality. 
Since the income satisfaction inequality is here defined in terms of variance, studying 
the causes of this inequality is equivalent to decomposing the variance of the income 
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Hence, we may assign to each component its relative share in contributing to the 













The  shares  add  up  to  one  and  each  share  is  non-negative.  Unfortunately,  this 
decomposition is impossible if the components are correlated, i.e.,  cov( , ) 0 i j Z Z ¹ . 
This is obviously the case for the IS- equation as age, income, education and children 
are correlated. Therefore, we have to apply a second-best solution. 
The variance decomposition we apply is performed by the well-known stepwise 
regression procedure.
4 We notice that we defined the structural part of equation (2) as 
the right-hand side without error-terms. We denote it by 
( ) s IS for short. Its variance is 
just the structural satisfaction inequality. If we regress 
( ) s IS  on all variables in (2) 
simultaneously we get of course an R
2 of 100 %. If we regress 
( ) s IS  on one variable 
X1 (and a constant) we get an R
2
1 of less than 100 %. It may be interpreted as the 
contribution of X1 to total inequality. Adding a second variable X2 the R
2
2 is increased 
from  R
2
1  to  R
2




1)  may  be  interpreted  as  the  additional 
inequality contribution caused by differences in the variable X2. It is obvious that this 
decomposition depends on the order of introduction of the variables except in the 
unlikely  case  that  the  two  variables  X1  and  X2  are  non-correlated.  This  variance 
decomposition method may be generalized to any arbitrary number of variables. The 
usual option in standard-software is that the order of successive introduction of the 
                                                            
4 An alternative decomposition would be by means of principal components. However, here we have 






variables is chosen, such that at each step the incremental explanation is maximized. 
We call this order the maximizing order. Obviously, we may impose any other order 
as  well.  In  Table  4.a  we  present  for  each  of  the  four  sub-samples  the  inequality 
decomposition  according  to  the  (sample-specific)  maximizing  order.  For  Western 
workers we find that a very large part may be explained by the long-term variables. 
The variable Mean (Ln(net family income), that is the average log-net family income 
over  the period 1992-1997  explains 65.63%  of the  structural  inequality. The  next 
factor Mean (Ln(adults)) gives an additional contribution of 12.21 % and a similar 
contribution is given by the number of children (defined as living at home below 16). 
The remaining transitional components give only a minor contribution adding up to 
about 12 %. For Western non-workers the picture is somewhat similar, although the 
long-term contribution is smaller. One transitional factor Ln(age) plays a significant 
role  as  well.  For  the  Eastern  part  of  the  population  the  situation  is  completely 
different. Here the long-term elements play a negligible role, while the transitional 
factors are leading. This is in conformity with the rather stormy developments in East-
Germany when compared to those in the western part of the country. 
 
Table 4a. Variance decomposition of income satisfaction inequality according to 
maximizing order. In percentages. 




         
Ln2(age)  2.59%  1.30%  2.62%  1.62% 
Ln(age)  3.40%  11.54%  14.97%  22.03% 
Ln(net family inc.)  0.87%  56.69%  0.86%  26.43% 
Male  0.17%  1.05%  3.48%  1.14% 
Living together?  2.07%  1.75%  3.06%  2.42% 
Ln(years Education)  1.17%  0.01%  0.76%  8.68% 
ln(net fam.inc.)               
               *ln(child.+1) 
0.15%  0.00%  0.56%  0.00% 
Ln(adults)  1.26%  11.44%  0.12%  22.17% 
Ln(Child.+1)  0.17%  8.16%  0.08%  13.95% 
Earner  0.05%  0.59%  XXX  XXX 
         
Mean(Ln(net fam. Inc.))  65.63%  6.06%  35.13%  0.62% 
Mean(Ln(Child.+1))  10.25%  0.01%  21.73%  0.26% 
Mean(ln(adults))  12.21%  1.41%  16.62%  0.69% 
 
In Table 4.b we present the corresponding decompositions, where we fix the order for 






Table 4b. Variance decomposition of income satisfaction inequality according to order 
in Table 2. In percentages. 
  West 
Workers 




         
Ln(age)  0.12%  5.68%  9.18%  2.72% 
Ln2(age)  1.34%  1.77%  23.41%  50.06% 
Ln(net family inc.)  56.60%  61.55%  42.99%  29.68% 
Ln(years Education)  6.48%  1.32%  1.43%  0.68% 
Ln(adults)  10.32%  14.20%  5.75%  11.98% 
Ln(Child.+1)  4.77%  4.83%  2.51%  1.94% 
ln(net fam.inc.)  
                       *ln(child.+1) 
0.18%  0.02%  0.09%  0.00% 
Male  0.28%  1.12%  3.88%  1.00% 
Living together?  3.41%  2.06%  3.63%  0.38% 
Earner  0.21%  0.94%    0.00% 
         
Mean(Ln(net fam. Inc.))  13.12%  5.14%  5.05%  0.62% 
Mean(Ln(Child.+1))  0.48%  1.37%  0.23%  0.68% 
Mean(ln(adults))  2.68%  0.01%  1.85%  0.25% 
 
When we compare Tables 4a. and 4b., we find that the order in which the different 
variables are brought into play is very important. Actually, the main burden of the 
inequality shifts in Table 4b. to the transitory factors, although the explanation of the 
long-term factors being about 16 % is still larger than the 12 % given to the transitory 
factors in Table 4a. For non-workers we find that age becomes a very important factor 
determining inequality.  
Finally, we may take a look at income satisfaction inequality in the whole of 
Germany (G). We use the well-known variance decomposition formula, where total 
variance is split up into the sum of the two within-group-variances and the between-
groups variance. The two groups are the West-and East-German population in this 
case. More precisely we have the identity 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) sat w sat E sat sat I G p I W p I E I BetweenEandW = + +                (5) 
 
where the p’s stand for the relative population shares. The last term is calculated by 
taking the variance of the mean of Western log-income satisfaction and the mean of 
Eastern  log-income  satisfaction  with  respect  to  the  overall  mean  log-income 
satisfaction. In a similar way we may go on and decompose Isat(W) and Isat(E) with 







respect to workers and non-workers. That decomposition is tabulated in Table 5. The 
results are comparable to those presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 5. Between-group decompositions for Income Satisfaction Inequality (Isat) 
Population 
Shares 
Group  Group  Variance of structural 
log-income satisfaction 
         
PW = 0.803  West      0.264 
PWW = 0.549    West Workers (WW)  0.186   
PWNW =0.451    West Non-Workers (WNW)  0.357   
    Between WW and WNW  0.001   
PE =0.197  East      0.265 
PEW =0.528    East Workers (EW)  0.141   
PENW =0.472    East Non-Workers (ENW)  0.328   
    Between EW and ENW  0.036   
         
  Between E and W     0.010   
  Germany      0.274 
 
Table 5 shows that the income satisfaction inequality in Germany as a whole is 0.274, 
and that there is virtually no difference between the two inequalities in East and West. 
The income satisfaction distribution of Non-workers is more unequal than for workers 
in both parts of the country. 
The same exercise may be done for the objective income inequality. The results 
are presented in Table 6. Again, the reader can compare these results with the ones 
presented  at  Table  5.  Table  6  illustrates  that  the  objective  income  inequality  in 
Germany as a whole is 0.259, which is somewhat smaller than the income satisfaction 
inequality. The Westerners suffer from a larger inequality than in the East and the 
same holds for the corresponding subgroups of workers and non-workers.. 
 
Table 6. Between group decompositions for Income Inequality 
Population 
Shares 
Group  Group  Variance of objective 
Log-incomes 
         
PW = 0.803  West      0.261 
PWW = 0.549    West Workers  0.218   
PWNW =0.451    West Non-Workers  0.284   
    Between WW and WNW  0.0132   
PE =0.197  East      0.219 
PEW =0.528    East Workers  0.173   
PENW =0.472    East Non-Workers  0.218   
    Between EW and ENW  0.0248   
         
  Between E and W     0.0063   







Recently  Gary  Fields  (2002)  suggested  another  decomposition,  which  may  be 
succinctly  described as  follows.  If  there  holds  1 1 ... k k Z Z Z b b e = + + + ,  there  also 
holds  
 
1 1 var( ) cov( , ) ... cov( , ) var( , ) k k Z Z Z Z Z Z b b e = + + +  
 
Division by var( ) Z yields  
 
1 ... 1 k p p pe + + + =  
 
This is another way to define inequality or variance shares. The advantage of this 
decomposition is that the shares do not depend on the order of introduction of the 
variables. They are uniquely defined, thereby avoiding the element of arbitrariness, 
which is inherent to the stepwise procedure, followed above. However, the price to be 
paid  is  that  the  shares  p  may  be  negative  or  larger  than  one,  which  makes 
interpretation  cumbersome.  It  is  therefore,  that  we  did  not  use  the  Fields-
decomposition. 
 
 5. Conclusions 
In this paper we extended the objective income concept by defining the subjective 
income  satisfaction  concept.  Similarly  we  extend  the  objective  income  inequality 
concept by defining an income satisfaction inequality concept. The Isat measure differs 
from  objective  measures  of  inequality  as  individual  subjective  satisfaction  with 
income  is  used  instead  of  objective  income.  In  other  words,  the  paper  presents 
estimates for feelings of income inequality. The measure Isat includes objective income 
inequality as a special case, namely, when subjective income satisfaction and income 
are identical.  
We find that only a relatively small part of Isat  can be attributed to observed 
factors.  This  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  there  would  be  no  other  observable 
causes of inequality. It may be that the specification presented in Table 2 omitted 
relevant observable variables. Nevertheless, this is not very likely, given the large 






different possible specifications. Even  if the  variance due to observable factors  is 
rather small, it is interesting to look at it, given that the objective variables are the 
only  ones,  which  policy  makers  can  take  into  account.  The  role  of  income  in 
explaining income satisfaction inequality is not insignificant but it is not the only 
causing factor. The number of people in the household and the age distribution are 
important as well.  Thus, even if objective income inequality remains certainly an 
important statistic to monitor the societal distribution process, this exercise shows that 
psychological  feelings  of  inequality  are  relevant  as  well.  Evidently,  this  research 
should be repeated for other populations, before we may generalize the findings of 
this paper. 
This paper contributes to the literature of inequality by presenting an income 
satisfaction  concept,  which  can  be  compared  to  objective  measures  of  inequality.  
Income satisfaction inequality differs from the established measures of inequality by 
using individual perceptions as a basis to make incomes comparable. The traditional 
measures of inequality introduce subjectivism via intuition by, for example, imposing 
family equivalence scales (such as the Oxford/OECD scale) or by introspection in 
choosing  a  concrete  welfare  function  specification  with  a  numerically  determined 
risk/inequality  aversion  parameter  (Atkinson,  1970).  The  introduction  of  income 
satisfaction  does  not  imply  that  objective  measurement  should  be  replaced  by 
subjective concepts throughout, but only that both measures have a different role to 
play. The subjective concept is in our opinion a valuable addition to the family of 
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